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BC3 Webinar: experimental protocols representing natural resources: repeated and dynamic

December 15, 2021 @ 12:00 pm - 1:00 pm


This seminar is composed of two presentations. It aims at introducing economic experiments as a tool for exploring better ways and mechanisms to manage common pool resources such as water, forests, soil etc. The two presentations will focus on two different types of experimental protocols representing natural resources: repeated and dynamic ones.

Effects of information sharing on common-pool resource extraction behaviour: Experimental findings

Prof. Stefano Farolfi


Our study experimentally investigates the impact of different information sharing mechanisms in a common-pool resource game, with a view to finding a mechanism that is both efficient and inexpensive for the managing agency. More precisely, we compare the observed extraction levels produced as a result of three mechanisms: a mandatory information sharing mechanism and two voluntary information sharing mechanisms that differ in the degree of freedom given to the players. Our main result is that a voluntary information sharing mechanism could help in reaching a lower average extraction level than that observed with the mandatory mechanism.

Individual and strategic behaviors in a dynamic extraction problem: results from a within-subject experiment in continuous time

Prof. Dimitri Dubois


We conduct a laboratory experiment to test a continuous-time model that represents a dynamic groundwater extraction problem in an infinite horizon. We compare the observations to the equilibrium path of the usual behaviors, for the case where the player is alone in extracting the resource (optimal control) and when two players extract the same resource simultaneously (differential game). We use a within-subjects design. This allows us to identify individual profiles of players playing alone and then characterize groups based on their composition
with respect to these individual behaviors. We find that approximately a quarter of the players and groups succeed in playing (significantly) optimally, and none behave myopically. We also identify other categories of players and groups that account for nearly 50% of the observations and that require attention.

About the Lecturer

Stefano Farolfi is a water economist (HDR) at CIRAD, UMR G-Water. He is particularly interested in issues related to negotiation, regulation and coordination in water governance, as well as behavioural analysis of water actors. He currently leads the PRECOS team (https://www.g-eau.fr/index.php/en/umr-geau/les-equipes/item/416-pratiques-representations-sociales-et-comportements-au-sein-des-socio-hydrosystemes-precos) on the practices, social representations and behaviours of water actors. Between 2014 and 2020, Stefano was DUa CIRAD at UMR G-Eau. He previously served eight years at the Centre for Economics and Environmental Policy in Africa (CEEPA), at the University of Pretoria, and four years at the International Centre for Economics and Water Governance in Africa (IWEGA), at E Mondlane University in Maputo. Stefano contributed to the establishment of this centre, of which he was the scientific director during his stay in Maputo.

Personal web page: http://www.g-eau.fr/index.php/en/cb-profile/1694-farolfi-stefano

Dimitri Dubois (Ph.D) is a research engineer at the National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS), member (and deputy director) of the Center for Environmental Economics – Montpellier (CEE-M). He is also the lab manager of the experimental economics laboratory of Montpellier (LEEM). His specialty is behavioral economics and experimental economics, and his main research topics are risk attitudes, social preferences and social dilemmas (public goods and Common Pool Resources).

Personal web page: http://www.duboishome.info/dimitri


December 15, 2021
12:00 pm - 1:00 pm


BC3-Basque Centre for Climate Change
Sede Building 1, 1st floor, Scientific Park of the University of the Basque Country
+34 944 014 690
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